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The recently published National Security Strategy (NSS) is meant to set the 
context for the forthcoming Defence White Paper, scheduled to make its 
appearance later this year. But on one key point the NSS falls short. While 
it provides a good coverage of Australia’s broad security interests, it might 
usefully have been more expansive about Australia’s strategic worldview. 
Perhaps ministers wanted to leave that topic for the Defence White Paper 
to address—both of the previous Defence White Papers included a chapter 
entitled ‘Australia’s Strategic Interests’, so it’s a reasonable assumption that 
this year’s will too. Or perhaps the government believes that the issue is 
already settled. When the Defence Minister spoke at both ASPI and Lowy 
functions in August last year, he specifically addressed the topic of strategic 
interests, rehearsing the earlier formulation of those interests without 
substantive criticism. If so, that’s a pity, because the formulation of strategic 
interests sketched out in the 2000 and 2009 Defence White Papers is limited, 
reactive, and heavily defence-oriented. 
Defence writing teams naturally gravitate towards a definition of strategic 
interests as those interests which are to be secured substantially or 
primarily through the use of armed force. That pulls them towards a narrow 
understanding of strategic interests—an understanding further constrained by 
a test of practical achievability given the resource limitations of the ADF.
It’s no surprise then that Australia (in the 2009 Defence White Paper) lists 
its ‘most basic strategic interest’ as defending the continent of Australia from 
armed attack. ‘Most basic’ is apparently intended to convey that this ranks 
as our most important strategic interest, given the language in the opening 
phrase of paragraph 5.7, where a secure neighbourhood is described as ‘our 
next most important strategic interest’. The security, stability and cohesion 
of our immediate neighbourhood, including Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, 
Timor-Leste, New Zealand and the South Pacific island states falls under 
this section. Controversially, the paper says Australia has an ‘enduring 
strategic interest in preventing or mitigating any attempt by nearby states to 
develop the capacity to undertake sustained military operations within our 
approaches’. This is a strange point: it implies we have an interest in keeping 
Indonesia militarily weak, when a stronger Indonesia could be of real benefit 
to us. And it raises a broader question—if we have an enduring strategic 
interest in keeping our neighbours militarily weak, why are we helping many of 
them under our current Defence Cooperation Program?
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Beyond our neighbourhood, the White Paper also argues that Australia has an 
‘enduring strategic interest’ in the stability of the broader Asia–Pacific region, from 
North Asia to the Indian Ocean. And finally, the White Paper identified a strategic 
interest in preserving an international order that restrains aggression, and manages 
a variety of risks and threats. The chapter in the 2000 White Paper is similar, though 
not identical, in its depiction and ‘layering’ of our strategic interests. 
But there’s a profound limitation in seeing Australia’s strategic interests merely as 
‘those national security interests…in relation to which Australia might contemplate 
the use of force,’ as the 2009 White Paper put it. For one thing, such an approach 
tempts us to invert the process—thinking first about where we might be willing 
(and able) to use force and then defining our strategic interests accordingly. A good 
example of this can be seen in Hugh White’s criticism of the 2009 White Paper for 
describing a stable and cohesive Indonesia as one of Australia’s ‘vital’ strategic 
interests. ‘The direct implication of this statement’, says White, ‘is that Australia 
would contemplate the use of force to support internal stability in Indonesia.’1 So 
what’s the answer? For White, ‘in regards to Indonesia, while internal stability is 
clearly very important to us, it is not a strategic interest (emphasis in original).’2 
But surely this is putting the cart before the horse: White is backcasting, deleting 
Indonesian stability from our list of strategic interests because we couldn’t use force 
to achieve it.
A second problem with limiting strategic interests to those in which we might 
contemplate the use of force is that it tempts us to think that Australia’s strategic 
interests are coterminous with its defence priorities. Some readers might imagine 
that we’ve always thought about strategic interests principally in defence terms, 
but that’s not so. Australian declaratory policy has occasionally been bold enough 
to suggest a grand strategy, harnessing all the tools of national power. While over 
forty years old, the 1968 Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy, for example, 
offers some crucial advice on considering the multiple elements of strategy (not just 
military)—advice that the authors of the 2013 DWP would do well to heed: 
Para 26: We must also beware, as we discuss strategic policy, to avoid considering 
the problem as one of purely military significance. Strategy embraces political, 
economic and social objectives equally with military, and sometimes the former may 
be more important. There must always be a close inter-relationship between defence 
policy and political and economic policies.
Consistent with that judgment, the 1968 paper observed, in paragraph 27, that ‘The 
security and stability that our strategic interests require cannot be achieved solely 
by military measures.’ The 1976 Defence White Paper included a similar thought: 
‘Insofar as we can directly influence developments shaping our strategic prospects, 
this will often be by the political rather than the military arm of policy.’3 But if that’s 
true, what’s the point of defining our strategic interests merely in relation to the 
military arm of policy?
Worst of all, our current approach contains nothing that might be described as 
proactive ambition. The overall effect is to portray Australia’s national strategic 
interests as narrow and reactive, when it would be better to be broad and proactive. 
On that point, it’s worth bearing in mind Walter Russell Mead’s definition of US 
grand strategy—that it’s the US project for the world.4 In a similar vein, Australian 
grand strategy should be understood as the Australian project for the world. That 
would be a departure from past practice, in part perhaps because Australian grand 
strategy has been devalued into a set of military planning guidelines.
Obviously, grand strategy needs to provide guidance to the likely roles and missions 
of the ADF. But governments pursue national interests and national objectives 
and use all instruments at hand to do so. They don’t pursue a separate series 
of military interests, diplomatic interests, police interests or even trade interests. 
National strategic interests are not something that Australian policymakers should 
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think about only in the narrow, defence-oriented manner that they have adopted in 
recent years.  
Beyond force
We might avoid the trap that strategic interests and strategic objectives are all 
about the use of force in either of two ways. The first would be to broaden our 
understanding of the ‘use’ of force, so that it includes broad, shaping activity as 
well as direct conflict. This is not an entirely facetious exercise: many of the best 
theorists of the use of force will argue that force is both more commonly and more 
importantly used in a gravitational manner (to provide a steady background context 
for international affairs and a shaping influence) than in a direct manner (to kill 
people and break things). That expanded understanding of the utility of force helps 
stretch our conception of strategic interest, but still doesn’t give us all we want, 
omitting as it does all of the other levers of power the government holds. 
The second, and better, way of escaping the trap is simply to say upfront that 
strategy is about how we pursue the world we want, and not just about the use of 
force. That means thinking about strategic interests in a more proactive, aspirational 
way. It allows us to identify the stability, integrity and cohesion of Indonesia, for 
example, as one of our strategic interests, even though we don’t contemplate 
securing that interest primarily through the use of force. In earlier declaratory 
strategy we made no bones about saying something similar about the entire 
Southeast Asian region. The 1968 Strategic Basis paper, for example, noted that 
building critical mass in Southeast Asia was Australian strategy, even though that 
couldn’t be achieved by the use of force.
We need to beware of a theme that is increasingly prevalent in our public debate 
today—that the success or failure of our strategic ambitions turns solely upon 
the military capacity of the ADF. In the current discussion of future numbers of 
submarines, for example, there’s a sense that if we don’t pass a set of tests built 
around defence capabilities then we’ll have failed our strategic priorities as a nation. 
That’s wrong. Our defence capabilities are only one of our instruments for pursuing 
grand strategy—and in an era of regional transformation that is neither driven by 
force nor stoppable by force, we’re probably back in those scenarios where the 
political arm of policy will be carrying more weight than the military arm.
How should we understand Australian grand strategic interests? 
Unsurprisingly, there’s no consensus among Australians about what the ‘Australian 
project’ for the world might entail. But that’s not unusual: Mead makes the point that 
in the US a consensus about the ‘American project’ has been historically rare—
essentially limited to the periods of the Monroe Doctrine and the Cold War. What’s 
more unusual is our refusal to even discuss the topic and our predilection to slide 
into a comfort zone in which strategy is all about force numbers.
Grand strategy focuses our attention on the world—on its potential make-up and 
not merely the task of managing its current and looming problems. It puts aside 
concepts of self-reliance and Fortress Australia. It aims at lofty ambitions. It implies 
proactive shaping policies rather than reactive hedging ones. It defines a role for us 
in relation to others, and not merely a role in relation to ourselves. 
If we think of strategy in the broader sense, Australia’s most important strategic 
interest is not defending our continent against armed attack. That might certainly be 
our most important defence interest, but—on the basis of the argument sketched 
above—we should try to avoid making our strategic interests merely overlay our 
defence ones. Rather, our most important strategic interest would be something 
grander: it would be in generating and sustaining a world whose make-up is 
characterised by the presence of many other liberal, democratic states and whose 
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order is shaped primarily by Western values and the active engagement of the 
world’s primary powers. In this vision, international values, norms and conduct 
would be similar to Australia’s and the world’s great powers would actively support 
adherence to these. A democratic, liberal, prosperous Australia would not endure 
long in a world where there were no other democratic, liberal, prosperous states. 
And a global reassurance order would not be stable in a world where great powers 
had no buy-in to the global system.
What can Australia do to promote such an objective? At the metaphoric level, 
perhaps we should think of our role as gyroscopic, rather than motor-related—a 
role that relates more to guidance than to motive power. But regardless of whether 
that’s a helpful way to think of our future role, we should make clear that our grand 
strategic objectives lie ‘upstream’, towards greater cooperation and an enhanced 
reassurance order, and that what we do ‘downstream’, hedging against a more 
conflict-prone region, is exactly that—our hedging position and not our strategy. 
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1 Hugh White (2009) ‘A wobbly bridge: strategic interests and objectives in Force 2030’, 
Security Challenges, 5, 1: 21-29, at 25.
2 White, ‘A wobbly bridge’, at 26.
3 Defence White Paper 1976, Chapter 3, paragraph 17.
4 Walter Russell Mead (2004) Power, Terror, Peace and War (New York: Alfred A Knopf).
 
About the authors
Rod Lyon is an ASPI Fellow specialising in international strategy.
Hayley Channer is an analyst at ASPI.
About Policy Analysis
Generally written by ASPI experts, the POLICY ANALYSIS series is provided online to give readers 
timely, insightful opinion pieces on current strategic issues, with clear policy recommendations when 
appropriate. They reflect the personal views of the author and do not in any way express or reflect the 
views of the Australian Government or represent the formal position of ASPI on any particular issue. 
 
ASPI Values
Collegiality
Originality & Innovation
Quality & Excellence
Independence 
 
ASPI
Tel + 61 2 6270 5100 
Fax + 61 2 6273 9566
Email enquiries@aspi.org.au
Web www.aspi.org.au
© The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited 2013
This publication is subject to copyright. Except as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part of 
it may in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, microcopying, photocopying, recording or 
otherwise) be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted without prior written permission. 
Enquiries should be addressed to the publishers.
Notwithstanding the above, Educational Institutions (including Schools, Independent Colleges, 
Universities, and TAFEs) are granted permission to make copies of copyrighted works strictly for 
educational purposes without explicit permission from ASPI and free of charge.
